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‘He did not think the banks had yet explored the enormous possibilities of mechanical methods.
He thought the counter work at English banks was about as efficient as they could ever get,
but he was suspicious as to whether they were as up to date behind the counter. He could see
the banks of the future as possessing physical bodies of wonderfully contrived mechanism, almost
everything of routine being done by machinery with the brains for the personal convenience of
customers, and scientific conditions of control, a great civil service with a high tradition of public
service, with opportunities for development and employment of many different talents. On the
other hand, it was conceivable they might develop into mere money making machines.’
John Maynard Keynes, ‘The future opportunities of the bank official’; presented at the
Cambridge Centre of the Institute of Banking; reported in the Cambridge Daily News,
15 October 1927; and, reprinted as ‘Mr J. M. Keynes on banking services’ in the Journal
of the Institute of Banking, November 1927, vol. xlviii, p. 497.
Banks engage in business which is intended to organise the profitable production of
financial services and, like other privately-owned firms in a market economy, employ
capital and labour to achieve this objective. Furthermore, as in other companies, it is
within banks that more efficient combinations of capital and labour generate productivity
growth. However, it has to be admitted that among banking historians, though usually
not those who have written histories of banks, investigations of business structure,
employment patterns, work organisation, labour relations and technological choice are
notable usually for their omission. Nevertheless, these features of commercial banks,
despite previous neglect, do have a wider significance for economists and economic
historians and challenge a number of well-established historiographic prejudices.
Although banks are often treated as a special case, perhaps largely because their products
are intangible, if not magical, to some observers, an investigation of bank organisation
and performance can shed light on some often neglected aspects of modern economic
growth. Three interrelated themes are highlighted here which suggest that the develop-
ment of modern commercial banks can reveal significant but underappreciated facets of
this vitally important phenomenon. These three themes, which are discussed in the context
of British commercial banking before 1939, recognise: first, the relative importance of the
services in a modern economy, for which banking here stands as representative of that
general class of activity; second, the functional significance of the financial sector and its
relationship with other sectors of a modern economy; and, third, the consolidation of
banks as large corporations which developed organisational structures adapted for the
performance of banking activity in dynamic circumstances. While the third theme, which
prompts questions about the consolidation, structure and organisation of the largest English
commercial bands, receives the major attention here the other two themes are indicated
to locate its proper context and insist upon its more general significance.
The contribution of service sector activity to the process of modern economic growth
has only recently begun to receive attention from economists and economic historians
commensurate with its relative contribution to economic activity.1 Typically it has been
assumed that the industrial sector, and manufacturing in particular, has pride of place in
the process of economic growth frequently, and significantly, referred to as the ‘Industrial
Revolution’. Nevertheless, the close association between sustained modern economic
growth and the positive contribution of the services to productivity growth over the last
century suggests that concentration on manufacturing leaves more than half the story
untold, be it for an individual economy such as the United Kingdom,2 or for international
comparative perspectives.3 Furthermore, the relationship between this process and the
development of the large corporation, its key institutional determinant, alongside the state,
suggests a complex and significant interconnection between the development of big
business on the one hand and structural change and economic development on the
other.4
Second, and as indicated recently by Levine,5 the significance and form of the financial
sector for economic growth is a contentious issue: for some the financial system plays a
crucial role, allowing the mobilization and direction of capital, whereas others regard its
importance as either exaggerated or insignificant and barely worthy of mention.6 One of
the crucial tests for champions of the former proposition is the contrast between the
British and German banking systems which are held to exemplify the market-based and
the bank-based financial system respectively. It has been often suggested that in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century the German bank-based financial system gener-
ated more rapid industrial growth than the British market-based system. But a conclusive
demonstration of this proposition has proved elusive and the conclusions of more recent
investigations, which have drawn on detailed archival research indicate that the English
banking system more closely resembled most other European systems than did the
German. Moreover, the differences between these two systems appears much more striking
in the pages of the banking manuals, and subsequent economic history textbooks, than
it would have been to the bankers who operated in either systems.7 It also has to be
admitted that the rhetoric of the bankers themselves, rather than their practice, may
have contributed greatly to this comparative assessment.
The third theme is the emergence of complex, large-scale industrial corporations which
collectively comprise the corporate economy, conventionally defined in terms of the
activities of the modern business enterprise in the industrial and extractive sectors.8
This is another contentious issue and one where, yet again, the British example often
does not escape unfavourable comparison.9 Chandler’s most recent work suggests a
taxonomy designed to illustrate international comparative analysis of the relationship
between economic performance and the emergence of the modern industrial enterprise;
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this classifies the United States as ‘competitive managerial capitalism’, Germany as
‘co-operative managerial capitalism, and the British system as ‘personal capitalism’.10
For Britain, because of the persistence of personal capitalism, the consequences were
deleterious as economies of scale or scope remained unexploited. Scale and Scope contains
an oft-quoted paragraph which serves to crystallize the key elements of this managerial
response which is taken to underpin the development of modern business enterprise and
the Corporate Economy:
The first was an investment in production facilities large enough to exploit a technology’s
potential economies of scale or scope. The second was an investment in a national
and international marketing and distributing network, so that the volume of sales might
keep pace with the new volume of production. Finally, to benefit fully from these two
kinds of investment the entrepreneurs also had to invest in management: they had to
recruit and train managers not only to administer the enlarged facilities and increased
personnel in both production and distribution, but also to monitor and co-ordinate
those two basic functional activities and to plan and allocate resources for future
production and distribution. It was this three-pronged investment in production,
distribution, and management that brought the modern industrial enterprise into
being.11
These managerial responses are considered later, with specific reference to English
commercial banking, but some general notes of caution should be identified immediately.
On this side of the Atlantic, Chandler’s verdict has been scrutinised with admiration
but not a little scepticism because of the many facets of economic development which
appear to have been banished from its ambit.12 Chandler has also not escaped criticism
back in the U. S. A.13 Furthermore, a recent investigation of European big business by
Cassis, which encompasses firms located in the United Kingdom, correctly emphasises
the relatively large scale, longevity, profitability and overall success of large British
companies.14
Recent research has also demonstrated that at the beginning of the twentieth century,
British firms, although frequently described as relatively small and managerially chal-
lenged,15 were much larger than they have been portrayed.16 The adoption of estimated
market value as a standard comparator indicates that in 1905, apart from a handful of
major American corporations, the largest British and U. S. manufacturing companies fell
within a very similar size range. Moreover, when this comparison is extended to all
companies in both economies, so that service-providing companies are considered, rather
than just industrial corporations, the much remarked upon difference in size between
American and British companies disappears.17 And English commercial banks figure
prominently amongst these large service sector companies which are all too often over-
looked in this context.
Concurrently, revisionist scrutiny has also been directed at the role of banks in the
emergence of the British corporate economy, where they are customarily cast as neglectful
and deficient suppliers of credit to industrial concerns.18 While bankers have often been
blamed for restricting industry’s access to capital in the interwar period, when they faced
particularly severe criticism for creating a barrier to organisational change or rationalisa-
tion,19 a counterview suggests British banks were not systematically neglectful of industry’s
financial needs but the problems of the industrial sector were such they defied even the
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substantial resources, experience and clout of the English banks.20 Unsurprisingly, this
unfolding academic debate reflects the divergence of opinion held by contemporaries.21
Whereas critics of the banking system, mainly commentators and politicians, insisted that
the British economy, and especially the industrial sector, was being handicapped by its
banking system, bankers themselves, and not a few industrialists, forthrightly rejected this
opinion, arguing that banks met fully their responsibilities to shareholders, customers and
employees.
Two major aspects of interwar banking history are discussed below to emphasise their
importance as key institutions in the emergence of the corporate economy in Britain.
First, the emergence and consolidation of the large English commercial banks and their
significance among the ranks of Britain’s largest companies is outlined briefly. Attention
then moves to the internal features of the major banks to consider their nature, structure
and organisation. This second theme highlights the significant emergence of explicit
managerial structures which divorced control from ownership, manifested an explicitly
hierarchical bureaucratic system and accommodated strategic, functional and operational
capabilities. These new managerial structures fostered the implementation of policies
designed to achieve at least the following interconnected objectives: organisational
change; increased functional specialisation; financial innovation; technical change; and,
the consolidation of an internal labour market. Two explicit features of the latter were
a formal career ladder and a discriminatory employment policy. Taken together, these
objectives demonstrate the recognition and deliberate shaping of corporate culture. In
short, British banks adopted a new business strategy in the 1920s which both required
significant managerial innovation and allocated the resources required to implement,
supervise and control the achievement of that goal. Moreover, the determinants of this
strategy were endogenous to the major British banks. Implementation of this new business
strategy may have been timely, coinciding as it did with the onset of the Great Depression
in Germany and the United States, but the economic difficulties which followed 1929
were an exogenous factor which further justified existing policy rather than a primary
spur to change.
The scale of the English commercial banks can be indicated by a number of measures,
including: market value; employment; number of branch offices; assets; deposits taken;
advances provided; and, profits,22 both declared and actual.23 The size of British com-
mercial banks, as indicated by market value and their rank order among Britain’s largest
companies, is shown in Table 1;24 clearly, by 1905 Britain’s largest banks qualified for
inclusion among the ranks of international ‘Big Business’. While consolidation of the
United Kingdom banking system resulted in the primacy of the ‘Big Five’ by 1919,25 it
also significantly increased concentration in the banking system;26 furthermore, as Table
1 shows, it also increased their relative standing in the national hierarchy of large
companies.
The expansion of the Midland Bank, the largest of the ‘Big Five’, is demonstrated in
Table 2 which highlights a number of significant features: the extent to which expansion
had occurred before 1910; the growth which took place in the decade dominated by the
First World War; the further consolidation of the 1920s; and, relative stasis in the decade
before 1940. For the Midland Bank it is also significant not only that expansion after
1920 came from the opening of new offices, rather than from further amalgamation, but
also that rationalisation occurred with the closure of over one hundred and fifty branches,
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largely where facilities were locally duplicated.27 Like all its rivals, the Midland Bank
engaged in an extensive, and expensive, building programme which saw the construction
of new branches and re-location to new head offices near the Bank of England.28
Although the Midland Bank was the largest of the ‘Big Five’,29 it was not untypical.
Modest shifts in relative size apart,30 the stability achieved by the ‘Big Five’ during the
interwar years stands in marked contrast to the experience of, for example, the financial
systems of Germany and the United States in the early 1930s. Nevertheless, despite
similarities, each of the ‘Big Five’ had its own individual corporate culture. For example,
with reference to organisational structure, the Midland is usually presented as the most
centralised and Barclays the least.31 However, this balance of centrifugal and centripetal
tendencies was one of emphasis, or degree, and it would be all too easy to overstate
differences between the banks. Strategy for each of the ‘Big Five’ banks was determined
by senior executives at headquarters located in London. And, although greater or lesser
latitude could be granted by executive officers to senior managers in the regions, there
was relatively little difference in the central office functions undertaken at the respective
headquarters of the ‘Big Five’. This communality of practice with regard to managerial
Table 1. English commercial banks as big business: Market value of equity (£m.)
and rank order of the English commercial banks among the largest British
companies listed in diminishing size, by market value, in 1934/5 and 1904/5
1934/5 1904/5 
£m. Rank £m. Rank 
Midland Bank 58.2 (11) 11.6 (30)
Barclays Bank 54 (13) 9.1 (38)
Lloyds Bank 43.8 (21) 14.1 (26)
Westminster Bank 38.7 (23) 7.8 (47)
National Provincial Bank 34.2 (26) 13.1 (27)
London and County Banking company 9.8 (36)
Parr’s Bank 7.1 (50)
Union of London & Smiths Bank, 8.5 (41)
Bank of England 53.7 (14) 44.5 (11)
Bank of Ireland [IFS] 9.9 (35)
Source: P. Wardley (1991) ‘The anatomy of big business: aspects of corporate development in the
twentieth century’, Business History, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 268-296; Tables 2 and 3.
Notes: The Westminster Bank, as it became in 1923, was the result of many amalgamations which
transformed the original London & Westminster Bank founded in 1834; these include two banks
which appear above as independent banks in 1905: the London and County Bank (amalgamated
in 1909) and Parr’s Bank (1918). The Union of London and Smiths Bank was the third bank
listed above in 1905 which was subsequently amalgamated; it became part of the National,
Provincial & Union Bank in 1918, retitled in 1924 the National Provincial Bank.
The Bank of England, the central bank for the United Kingdom, was privately owned by its
shareholders, as was the Bank of Ireland which became the central bank of the Irish Free State
(IFS) founded in 1922.
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innovation was also enhanced by frequent and detailed exchange of information between
senior bank officers; by contrast, little or nothing was revealed at such meetings about
each bank’s respective customers and their terms of business.
Table 2: Midland Bank expansion, 1880-1960
1) Balance sheet reports of paid up capital, deposits, advances, bills and actual profits, £ millions:
Capital paid up Deposits Advances Bills Actual profits
1880 0.3 2.0 1.3 0.6 0.06
1890 0.6 5.6 3.5 1.4 0.14
1900 2.5 37.8 19.8 4.1 0.58
1910 4.0 73.4 41.1 6.7 0.89
1920 10.9 371.8 189.7 57.7 4.2
1930 14.2 399.6 203.6 83.9 2.1
1939 15.2 496 221 n.a. 2.8
1950 15.2 1,392 344 n.a. 2.7
1960 24.2 1,709 759 n.a. 8.3
2) Staff employed, total number of branches and sub-branches open, and sources of change in stock of
branches:
Staff employed Branches &
sub-branches
open
Branches added
by amalgamation
Branches opened Branches closed
(over previous decade)
1890 350 45 8 16 –
1900 1,500 314 149 111 8
1910 3,691 689 247 135 3
1920 10,697 1,497 517 274 5
1930 13,192 2,100 – 691 91
1940 13,548 2,031 –*  126* 60*
1950 15,648 2,118 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1960 21,970 2,273 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sources: W. F. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of Joint Stock Banking (1958: 3rd. ed.:
Hodder and Stoughton: London), pp. 326, 333, 347; A. R Holmes and E. Green, Midland: 150
years of banking (1986: Batsford: London), pp. 323-326, 332-335, 339.
Notes: * Data only available for the quinquennium 1930-34.
n.a. not available.
Here the managerial innovations and changes in accounting practices required to
achieve bank amalgamation should not be underestimated, and neither should the
contending sectional identities which evidenced a previous heritage. Naturally, the
ensuing difficulties were probably most severe in a former head office rendered by
amalgamation a mere branch. Even in the Midland, this process of internal consolidation
was only completed a decade after the death, in 1919, of its architect, Sir Edward
Holden.32
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The corporate culture of each of the ‘Big Five’ was a result of the varied history of
the bank itself. Each constituent bank acquired during the long, drawn-out process of
growth by amalgamation brought with it its own idiosyncratic practices and customs. As
Crick and Wadsworth point out, this proved to be an enduring problem:
’Time and again amalgamations had given rise to the necessity of removing acute
differences of method which involved inefficiency and waste. Often it was found that
systems of branch organisation and control had been shaped on different lines, and it
was necessary to bring these systems into uniformity in order to secure the highest
common factor of efficiency.’ 33
In the search for efficiency and internal uniformity each of the ‘Big Five’ banks introduced
a number of managerial innovations; these included: the consolidation of managerial
structures which permitted functional specialisation, both at the head office and in the
individual branch; the development of internal labour markets; and, the introduction of
new technology, which itself had major implications for the organisation, administration
and operation of the major clearing banks. Many aspects of the labour process were
transformed, with gender playing a significant role, such that the business culture of each
of these organisations was reconstructed in the interwar period.
Corporate development and the organisation of English banks before
1939.
Consolidation of the ‘Big Five’ required the development of clear management structures
and a division of responsibilities between the head office and the branches. Much of this
depended upon the transmission of high quality and relevant information: head office
functions could be performed efficiently only if branches provided regular communication
of appropriate standardized information; branches could act effectively only if the in-
structions issued from head office were regular, specific, and informed. New procedures
were adopted, or old ones adapted, to ensure that the branch system worked under the
supervision of the central office; it was, however, essential that these procedures, whatever
their heritage, were formalised. Even where the necessary managerial structures were in
place before the First World War, as in the case of the Midland Bank,34 they were
reassessed and recast according to new demands, circumstances and opportunities. As
discussed below, mechanization was an instance of this.
This essential divide between head office and branch resulted in formal functional
specialisation which can be illustrated by a model derived from a contemporary account
of English banking methods written by Leonard le Marchant Minty.35 The term “model”
is not used by Minty, but it does seem apt as he generalises to produce an archetype
representing the essential organisational features of the ‘Big Five’, even though each had
its own characteristics and idiosyncrasies. It is probable that the Westminster Bank was
probably the closest to this ideal type. Figure 1 illustrates the departmental structure of
a head office. The titles of the various departments refer to the various departments and
indicate both their functions and the extent of internal functional specialisation.36 One
department has been added to Minty’s schema 37 – the Machinery Department, a very
recent innovation, as demonstrated below.
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Figure 1. Organizational structure, and functional specialisation
by department, of the headquarter offices of an interwar British joint stock bank
Board Room:
Directors
Executive Offices: 
Chairman
Managing Directors 
Joint General Managers 
Assistant General Managers
Functional departments:
Chief Accountant’s Office Legal Department
Branch Inspection Office Premises Department
Chief Inspector’s Office Safe and Securities Department
Bill Office and Brokers’ Loans Intelligence Department
Stock Office Staff Department
New Issues Office Income Tax Department
The Coupon Office Credit Information Department
Clearing Departments Stationery Department
Branch Ledger Department Machinery Department
Head Office Correspondence & Circulating Department
Source: after L. le M. Minty (4th ed., London 1930) English Banking Methods.
Figure 2. Functional specialisation by department of a ’Foreign’ or ’Overseas’
branch of an interwar British joint stock bank
Functional departments:
Dealing Room Foreign Bills for Collection
Telegraphic Transfer Inland Bills
Currency Account Securities
Sterling Accounts
Cash or Clearing Department Mail Transfers
Inland Payments Correspondence Department
Commercial Credits “Inwards”
Commercial Credits “Outwards”
plus, specialist offices:
Enemy Debts Clearing Department
Cunard Office (Midland Bank)
Source: after L. le M. Minty (4th ed., London 1930) English Banking Methods.
Even before the First World War, ‘Big Five’ banks had installed ‘Foreign’ or ‘Overseas’
departments to undertake banking business external to the United Kingdom: Lloyds
Bank’s foreign department was established in 1898,38 the Midland’s Foreign Banks
Department by 1902.39 True to their distinctive histories and corporate cultures, organi-
sation of this facility varied by bank. Where the Midland Bank had a single centralised
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department, decentralisation determined that Barclays Bank’s Chief Foreign Branch was
supplemented not only by provision in the West End (Pall Mall, London) but also by
Foreign branches in Manchester, Liverpool, Bradford, and in 1927, Birmingham.40 Like
the Head Office, foreign branches or departments also exhibited specialisation by func-
tion: Figure 2 indicates the sections which provided the international banking services
demanded by the customers of a ‘Big Five’ Bank.41 As a specific example of corporate
enterprise, Minty highlighted here the Midland’s establishment in 1919 of a department
to supervise its branch banks on board Cunard’s ocean liners.42 Specialist sections were
also created to supervise transactions between branches overseas and branches in England
and even to advise on ‘Enemy Debts’ after World War One. Interestingly, the foreign
departments of a ‘Big Five’ bank often provided a initial testing ground for the implemen-
tation of new methods and techniques, including machine accounting. By the 1920s,
increasing demands on head office facilities and expansion of foreign business often
required the relocation of the foreign branch to a separate but proximate location,
increasing still further the necessity of a standardised managerial information system.
Although the determination of strategy and higher managerial functions were confined
to the head office of a ‘Big Five’ bank, functional specialization was also to be found at
the branches. By 1930 an average branch probably had about seven staff but the larger
branches could have circa thirty staff, including: a manager; a sub-manager; an accountant;
Figure 3. A traditional branch banking office – the Portishead branch of the National
Provincial Bank at the beginning of the twentieth century. (NatWest Group Archives)
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four or five cashiers; four or five ledger keepers; between ten and twelve other clerks;
two juniors; six lady clerks; two messengers and a nightwatchman. Here, too, the physical
layout of the branch coincided with the functions delivered. The public were served by
cashiers at the counter; behind was the waste office which accepted cheques and recorded
the details in waste books; then came the ledger office where debits and credits were
entered to customer accounts; and, last in this progression through the branch, was the
Day Book, a department which processed information provided by the Ledger Officer
and recorded it in Ledger Books and produced the all important trial balance. Addition-
ally, there would be a Correspondence Office, a Bills and Securities Office, an
Accountant’s Office, where the returns to head office would be prepared, together with
separate office accommodation for the Manager and Sub-Manager.43
It was the branch where most customers came into contact with the bank’s staff. Only
the most important clients had dealings with head office which scrutinised all major loans
Figure 4. Machine banking in inter war Britain: the central banking hall at Lothbury after the
mechanisation of the Westminster Bank’s headquarter functions. (NatWest Group Archives)
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over a specified amount, below this stipulation a branch manager was allowed discretion.
One important part of a branch’s business was the search for new accounts and one
financial innovation, the home safe, was introduced in the 1920s to attract new customers
with relatively small surpluses. Business undertaken in many branches also changed
significantly as cheques became much more heavily used in the 1920s and bills declined
in relative importance. This shift in demand for bank services on the part of customers
had major implications for the banks which faced a much heavier working load as a
consequence and this was an additional stimulus to the search for cost cutting measures.
While the branches delivered the bank’s services to its customers, the various depart-
ments functioned in accordance with the policies laid down by senior managers who, in
conjunction with the board of directors, determined strategy. The functional interme-
diaries, who played the essential role of overseeing the communication and
implementation of policy, were the Bank Inspectors. In addition to their role of ‘policing’
the branches to ensure accounting efficacy and probity, the inspectors ensured that policy
and procedure was understood and acted upon by each branch. It was probably the
Inspectors who initially saw the potential, and recognised the necessity of introducing
new methods which would enable the bank to operate more efficiently. The Machinery
Departments were closely linked and were eventually to be reabsorbed into the Inspection
Departments. One important role usually played by the Inspection Department of a ‘Big
Five’ bank was a regular review of the performance of individual staff members, this
review informed decisions concerning promotion and salary increments which were
essential features of the bank’s internal labour market.
Internal labour markets
A substantial branch system directed by a centralized and specialist head office required
a large number of employees and the development of internal labour markets; moreover,
it required the development of a formal, standardised system to record the careers of all
employees.44 The ‘Big Five’ developed internal labour markets at least fifty years before
economists drew attention to the consequences of this development.45 In the context of
a dual labour market, clearly the ‘Big Five’ provided ‘primary’ jobs designed to secure a
stable labour force. Once admitted to a staff position through the limited ‘port of entry’,
normally recruiting directly from school on the basis of examination performance, banks
provided male staff with ‘good’ jobs: the rate of remuneration was relatively high; standard
incremental pay scales offered protection against the vagaries of the market and arbitrary
decisions of superiors; tenure was secure; pension rights were guaranteed; holidays entit-
lements and ‘perks’ were specified; and, for male entrants alone, a promotion ladder
appeared to offer the opportunity to ascend to the summit of the managerial hierarchy.
Furthermore, these contractual aspects were buttressed by a number of devices designed
to foster a corporate culture; these included in-house staff magazines, social activities and
sports clubs.
Trade unions often figure in the literature as important determinants of internal
labour markets; however, although the banks tolerated or encouraged, perhaps less than
enthusiastically the organisation of internal company-specific staff associations, the
limited success of the Bank Officers Guild, which was registered as a trade union in 1920,
suggests this factor was marginal, if not irrelevant, in this case. Similarly, high labour
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turnover, another reason sometimes cited by labour economists to account for an internal
labour market, can also be discounted. However, there was one determinant may have
played a role here, though not one usually associated with the banking industry; internal
labour markets are often associated with companies which are dynamic and exploit
changing technology, which corresponds with the significance of mechanization ascribed
below.
For banks, however, there was an obvious causal factor. It was particularly important
for a bank to secure employees who exhibited specific personal qualities and characteristics
including honesty, integrity and trust: theoretical issues associated with moral hazard and
the principal-agent relationship are not difficult to identify in the banking industry.
Moreover, not only were bank employees obliged to act so that they generated customer
confidence when they appeared behind the bank counter or in the bank office they were
also expected to act as respectable and trustworthy individuals outside working hours,
playing a responsible role in the local society.46
The ‘Big Five’ bank also developed discriminatory labour policies. By the 1930s female
clerical staff also enjoyed tenure, incremental pay scales and, relative to other female
workers, advantageous working conditions, but they received much lower rates of re-
muneration,47 were subject to a marriage bar,48 and faced a concrete rather than a glass
ceiling, having no prospects for promotion to senior managerial or executive posts. Porters
and messengers faced very restricted pay scales, sometimes age-related; however, gender
discrimination continued even at this lower level in a bank’s hierarchy as female cleaners
and canteen workers received a lower, basic wage.
These internal market structures appear to illustrate an efficiency-orientated institu-
tional response to the market forces generated by firm-specific jobs, training and
technology as suggested by Williamson, Wachter, and Harris.49 With the establishment
of those parameters of the labour contract which could be explicitly specified to the
satisfaction of both parties, given the realities of power relationships between management
and employees, at least some of the costs of perpetual bargaining over the labour effort
and turnover costs were reduced or eliminated.
Moreover, as the banks improved their screen processes, through the introduction of
training courses, encouragement of examination success and, in particular, appraisal
schemes, it became possible to encourage efficiency through the promotion of staff judged
meritorious. Thus the effects of promotion, both effective and demonstrative, reduced
the costs of monitoring and supervision and contributed to the development of an efficient
internal labour market. Pay scales and promotion ladders not only encouraged staff to
acquire the specific information and skills required to fulfil their current employment
obligations but also ensured that staff had opportunities to develop specific training which
would equip them to serve in senior posts (learning, at the very least, “sitting by Nellie”).
Consequently, when acting in either a supervisory or policy-making capacity, managers
would not only understand the nature of the job but they would also understand how
and why it was done.
Although remuneration was paid to the job rather than on an assessment of individual
performance, the ‘Big Five’ developed similar internal markets, each bank ensuring that
training was a complement to the production of bank services and screening advancement
for appropriate individuals according to specific criteria; such institutional relationships
and arrangements, it has been suggested, ‘may well be the most efficient apparatus for
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collecting and analysing data on individual performance’.50 Although some of these
institutional relationships already had a long history by the outbreak of the First World
War, many were relatively new, and probably the majority of these arrangements were
disrupted by changes introduced in the 1920s. After 1928 mechanization was to transform
many aspects of bank practice.
Mechanization, machine ledger keeping and centralization in English
Commercial Banks
Although the telephone could be seen as the pioneering modern technology, many new
techniques and gadgets were adopted in commercial offices, banks included, at the
beginning of the twentieth century.51 Alongside typewriters, besides steel filing cabinets,
and under electric lighting, a range of new materials, products and techniques were to
be found that supplemented novel adding machines introduced as the first mechanical
aids to banking almost coincident with the outbreak of the First World War.
The major technical innovation of the interwar period introduced both at head offices
Figure 5. “Then” and
“Now”. C. Sporn’s cartoon
refelecting changing
attitudes to women
employees. NATPROBAN
(Autumn 1938), p. 77.
(NatWest Group Archives)
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and in the branches of the ‘Big Five’ was the introduction of accounting machines which
allowed the posting, or data handling, of bank ledgers and customer statements, both
commercial and personal. With accounting machines came standardization as their
introduction transformed banking operations with the implementation of procedures
designed to ensure all data handling (i.e. data collection, data presentation, data pro-
cessing, data storage and data retrieval) were systematic and uniform. The specific
machines preferred by an individual bank depended upon an assessment of the features
supplied and the bank’s requirements, but each of the ‘Big Five’ responded to rising costs
and an increase in business, both the number of customers and transaction undertaken,
by adopting this technology.
While this technology could be described as primitive and unwieldy from a vantage
point at the end of the twentieth century, it was the “cutting-edge” technology of its
day. Furthermore, in addition to being an essential step to technically superior systems,
this technology, and the associated management information system created to utilise it,
was a highly successful innovation provided the key-stone of the banks’ operations for
the next thirty years, when it was replaced by new management systems created to
Figure 6. ‘Our mechanised
banks: the inspectors call’,
Spread Eagle (1930), p. 531.
(Barclays Bank Archives)
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accommodate mainframe computers. For those who like to view the development of
economies and businesses in terms equivalent to biological processes this sequence can
be seen as an excellent example of punctuated equilibrium where a period of stasis is
followed by one of rapid change after which stasis is restored, with the possibility of a
similar epoch of transition disturbing the new equilibrium at a later date.52
Detailed descriptions of the technology and assessments of the various machines
appeared in the banking journals, particularly in the autumn of 1929 when this was a
‘hot’ topic. Full descriptions and technical details of neither the book-keeping systems
Figure 7. ‘Our mechanised
banks: a forged cheque is
presented to the mechan-
ical cashier’, Spread Eagle
(1931), p. 283. (Barclays
Bank Archives)
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nor the various machines is provided here, although the relevant manufacturers are
indicated by reference to a contemporary expert, assessing a decade of machine banking
in an article published in 1938, who would have sympathised with this omission:
“It will be noticed that I have made no attempt to distinguish between methods of
book-keeping in the proposed centralized book-keeping offices. It does not seem to
me important for the moment to discuss whether the machines of the Burroughs,
National Cash Register, Remington etc. companies are used, nor is this the place to
argue the merits of these machines as against entirely different methods such as are
utilized by punched-card machines of the Hollerith or Powers-Samas type.” 53
By the mid-1920s senior managers of the ‘Big Five’ held growing concerns about rising
costs of production and control over the process of production which gave rise to an
interest in mechanization.54 Although the Midland Bank and the Westminster Bank
were the most visible proselytisers, reporting their progress in a ‘Special Issue’ of The
Banker (itself an unusual, if not unique, event) entitled ‘Bank Mechanization’ in August
1929, the other large commercial banks were already inaugurated their own systems. By
1930 the ‘Big Five’ had all introduced more or less complete systems of machine-book
keeping and similar systems had been introduced at many of the London offices of the
Colonial banks. However, although the systems were complete, implementation was
largely restricted to Head Offices and larger branches. As implementation continued the
minimum size of an economically viable machine ledger branch fell from the initial
estimate of 15 staff in 1928 to 12 in 1930,55 and to 8 in 1933.56 At this limit mechanization
would have been economic in only about half the branches of each of the ‘Big Five’ but
the scope for mechanization was enlarged by grouping smaller branches together in a
local clearing pool served by a single mechanized branch which processed the records of
the others.
Centralization,57 as this was known at the Midland Bank, was implemented in December
1929 and discussed at a meeting of the Institute of Banking Debating Society the following
month. The star performer was at this session was H. L. Rouse (Assistant Chief Accountant
at the Midland Bank). Rouse reported the extent to which mechanization had been
introduced, with 73 branches converted to the new system, and plans for a further 45
branches to be converted during 1930. The new system already accommodated approxi-
mately 165,000 accounts and catered for 7,000,000 postings a month; in all 325 machines
had been installed; 296 machines at Head Office and various large branches, plus 29
machines to cope with the work at months end and heavy periods. Rouse also reviewed
branch expansion and the increase in employment in the Midland Bank since 1924 to
indicate how mechanization allowed the substitution of female labour and capital for male
staff with a consequent reduction in cost.58
Rouse also explained that although the proportion of women employed in the bank
would increase, the promotion opportunities of newly recruited male clerks would improve
and, from the bank’s point of view, this would encourage the quality of male recruitment;
the latter had been a recurrent cause for concern for the senior officers since mechani-
zation had begun and it had only been made worse by the restraint on recruitment which
followed the economic downturn after 1929. The allocation of mundane and repetitive
tasks to female machine operatives would facilitate more rapid promotion of junior male
staff ‘to undertake such responsible tasks as the discounting of bills, cashiering, and
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security work’. He also pointed out that with this creation of two distinct categories of
staff, with supervisory and clerical grades, British banks would more closely resemble
Continental and American banks.59
Mechanization in the ‘Big Five’ even had an impact on popular culture, as reports of
robotic bankers swept the national press when a machine accounting system was intro-
duced at Lothbury, the head offices of the Westminster Bank, on 18 April 1933. This
was accomplished only after a full appraisal of the Bank’s existing system and its
functional departments (see Figures 1 and 2) had been conducted to plan a compre-
hensive re-organisation of management structures and operations. This strategic view
informed the detailed specification of the plan and drew upon experience gained in the
mechanization of over a hundred branches and Threadneedle Street. Mechanized in
February 1932, Threadneedle Street was the location of some head office functions,
including the bank’s training school. Once the decision had been taken to mechanize
Lothbury, accounting machines were selected, after careful appraisal of the range of
available models, and intensive six week training programmes were organised at the
Bank’s training school, which equipped head office staff with the skills required to
operate the system to be implemented. After the event, this training, which had been
followed by an ensuing period of practical experience in a mechanized branch, was
recognised as being of ‘enormous importance’.60 Finally, the internal lay-out of Lothbury
was reconstructed, section by section, to minimise disturbance to business (see Figure 4),
according to plans drawn up the bank’s architect to meet the following criteria:
‘1. Every ledger and statement poster, and every control operator, has what is effect
an office to himself including all the desk space and filing accommodation required
for his work. He can, therefore, work in complete comfort, and no matter how
much traffic there is in the gangways he cannot be incommoded.
2. All other machine operators have desks beside the machines of sufficient size for
the work of sorting, etc., and ample gangways behind them so that they also can
work in comfort.
3. All lighting has been specially designed so that any glare from the keys is avoided.
The amount of light is ample and can be varied by each operator. There is a
separate light for each machine.
4. Every machine has a separate fuse plug beside it with a cartridge fuse so that a fuse
blowing affects only the particular machine and takes on a few seconds to replace.
5. Everything has been so arranged that the work flows forward from one stage to the
next with the minimum amount of movement. Cross traffic has been avoided.
6. Very ample filing space of the most suitable design for the particular forms, etc.,
has been provided in the places most convenient for the work.’ 61
Careful specification of working conditions was matched by a close inspection of work
undertaken by head office departments. After a detailed study of departmental organisa-
tion at Lothbury, work was reorganized so that: all possible work was mechanized; all
work in mechanized departments which could not be mechanized was transferred to
non-mechanized departments; the procedures of non-mechanized sections were changed
so they integrated with those of mechanized sections; and, ‘everyone in non-mechanized
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sections understood exactly the changes, if any, that machine accountancy would necessi-
tate in their existing procedures’.62
Within a year of its original conception, and after six months of careful preparation
for its execution, the changeover from the hand-written system to machine accounting
at the Westminster Bank was achieved between the close of business on Easter Saturday
and the next working day.63
Having illustrated the extent of managerial changes implemented in the ‘Big Five’
during the interwar period, there remains the question of its efficacy in producing cost
reductions. The example of the Midland Bank will suffice, at least for the moment, to
indicate the scale of economies achieved by mechanization, the associated influx of
female staff and managerial reorganization in general. Six years after the initial implemen-
tation of mechanical ledger posting Rouse was able to refine his earlier estimate that two
male clerks could be released for the cost of one female machine operator with more
definite results: ‘the actual figures show that for every two ledger-posting machines
installed, 2.1 male clerks have been released and it has only been necessary to engage .
5 female operators for every two ledger-posting machine installed’.64 As female salaries
(circa £150 p. a.) were half those of their male counterparts (circa £300 p. a.) this
represented a significant saving in labour costs. As the ledger-posting machines cost in
the order of £420 and had a life expectancy of about ten years, the total savings, after
allowing for the cost of the capital equipment were far from insignificant. Contemporary
estimates, based conservatively on Rouse’s initial evaluation of staffing redeployment,
suggested that the break-even point, after investment in all aspects of the system (i.e.
including training, accommodation, sundry expenses etc.), would occur about two years
after the installation of accounting machines. In crude terms, though, the saving achieved
by the installation of each machine approximated to the salary of a male staff employee.
Overall, it would appear that by 1939, through the introduction of machine accounting
the ‘Big Five’ had collectively made annual net savings on costs in excess of £1 million;65
this was a reduction equivalent to about 7% of total labour charges and circa 3% of total
costs. Although all the savings achieved through related managerial and employment
changes are not included in this estimate, it does represent an initial, though approximate
and admittedly conservative, financial estimate of the economies of scale achieved by
the ‘Big Five’ through the operation of national branch banking systems supervised
centrally from a head office.
However, mechanisation of British banking accomplished much beyond its cost cutting
objective. In addition to the direct economic benefits which accrued from the introduc-
tion of machine banking, the impact of the new technology was considerable and
all-pervasive: the new machines had an obvious presence, which often required recon-
struction of the office space needed to accommodate them; working them necessitated
new work practices; and, their impact on social relations at work was significant and
extensive. The extent of this influence, and the degree to which employees were aware
that mechanisation impinged directly on their daily lives at work, is demonstrated by
the multitude of articles and cartoons on the subject which appeared in the banks’ staff
magazines published between 1928 and 1935. Three cartoons will suffice to illustrate the
conscious perceptions of bank workers. First, Figure 5 illustrates not only the radical
transformation of the work process, with hand-written ledgers replaced by machine-
processed records, but also aspects of gender associated with feminisation of the clerical
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labour force and the working environment.66 Although this picture undoubtedly over-
romanticises the lost gentlemanly attitude to female clerks, clearly the implications of
women workers becoming extensions of a machine was evident to all bank workers.
Second, issues of control and supervision of a branch bank are raised in Figure 6. Here
representatives from headquarter offices, senior staff employed in the Inspection Depart-
ment, appear as technicians arriving to scrutinise and fine-tune operation of a mechanical
banking system at the local level. Finally, there were the customers. In addition to their
own trepidations concerning change at work, bank workers were well aware of public
anxiety concerning mechanisation.67 This apprehension was not confined to aspects of
security nor to the accuracy of record-keeping. In Figure 7 an attempt to defraud a branch
with a forged cheque has shocking consequences – but the cartoon also carries the
implication that impersonal service threatened to damage the personal relationship which
so many customers valued highly. As these cartoons so clearly illustrate, recognition of
the cost cutting aspects of bank mechanisation alone would represent a failure to
appreciate the far-reaching impact of this managerial and technical transformation.
Figure 8. Mechanised banking at the Leicester Branch of the Westminster Bank, circa 1938.
(NatWest Group Archives)
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Conclusions
During the interwar period a managerial transformation of the ‘Big Five’ banks was
achieved which belies their popular reputation as holders of conservative and tradition-
alistic attitudes. The solitary bank office or the small scale banking organisations which
developed as the initial steps taken on the road to extensive branch banking were already
regarded as quaint historic novelties by the Edwardian period. Banks as large business
organisations with central offices overseeing numerous distant branches were already
established before the First World War. While military service was an exogenous shock
which altered temporarily the employment structure of the banks, some of whom admitted
women as banking staff for the first time,68 subsequent developments within the banks
produced a discriminatory employment structure with selection by gender. The employ-
ment of women, at lower rates of remuneration, was not the only response of the banks
to rising staff costs and machines were introduced in order to substitute capital for labour.
However, the typical pattern was to jointly substitute female labour and accounting
machines for male labour. Senior officers in the banks, having noted that female workers
were adept in the use of keyboards and were employed in jobs which, by definition,
excluded any promotion to managerial or executive positions, saw the potential offered
by reorganization and mechanization to cut costs, standardize practices, impose supervision
at all levels of activity, raise efficiency and, more generally, centralise the management
of large scale, corporate organisations.
Although these developments have been documented in at least three of the more
recent bank histories,69 the extent of this change has largely eluded economic historians
of the interwar period who, for the most part, while noting the amalgamation movement,
do not recognise the extent and significance of the associated changes in management
structure and organisation.70 Alford provides a very recent example of a literature which
presents senior British bank officials as insular, amateurish, elitist, resistant to change
and generally conservative:
’Yet there is evidence to suggest that merchant banks and other financial institutions
(including British multinational banks overseas) proved slow to adapt to changing
conditions. Lack of entrepreneurial enterprise was no less evident in City banking
parlours than it was in company boardrooms.’ 71
In fact, professional management had replaced entrepreneurial enterprise in the ‘Big
Five’ by the end of the 1920s.
In similar vein, the role of the banks in the alleged slow adoption of the corporate
form in Britain provides the central thesis of Cottrell’s recent essay, ‘Finance and the
germination of the British corporate economy’. This outlines the bank amalgamation
movement and the development of national branch banking but, beyond mention of
‘management styles’ and ‘the introduction of mechanised book-keeping’,72 does not
examine the emergence of corporate structures and the evolution of managerial organi-
sation among the ‘Big Five’. Rather, Cottrell opines that ‘common to both large
manufacturing companies and large commercial banks was the lack of managerial devel-
opment, a corporate lag that was to persist until the 1960s’.73
This view is incompatible with the interwar managerial transformation of the ‘Big
Five’. Indeed, given the pace and extent of change between 1928 and 1934, similar
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changes in other business organisations might even warrant the description ‘revolutionary’
rather than ‘evolutionary’. However, to affirm the extent of managerial changes within
the ‘Big Five’ is not to suggest that all their managerial difficulties had been solved in
the interwar period, nor that there was no potential for further development.
In addition, while it may be true of some elements of the manufacturing and extractive
industries, for the banking sector, at least, there is also good reason to reject Alford’s
suggestion that the interwar years inherited a general reluctance to change the status quo
post bellum which impeded the introduction of new techniques, methods and managerial
structures:
’Central to the needs of business reorganization was technical change involving new
labour practices and reduced manning levels. The war conspired to fuse the interests
of businessmen and organized labour in their resistance to innovation.’ 74
In the banking sector significant managerial and institutional changes began before the
First World War, continued in novel directions during the War, and resulted in new
organisational arrangements afterwards. In the case of commercial banking, at least: Britain
was not slow to start down the path to corporate structures; Britain was not tentative in
its adoption of these techniques; and, Britain did not lag significantly behind the USA,
or Germany. Moreover, although British bankers were willing to learn from the practices
and experiences of their contemporaries abroad, their implementation of this process was
carefully considered, indigenously determined, and not imitative in nature.
Furthermore, this thesis can be gauged against Chandler’s summary of the three pronged
strategy adopted by managers of the modern industrial enterprise:75 from 1900, if not
before, the senior officials of British commercial banks: first, did invest in production
facilities large enough to exploit the potential economies of scale or scope of the relevant
technology; second, did invest in a national and international marketing and distribution
network, so that the volume of sales might keep pace with the new volume of production;
and, third, did invest in management so to benefit fully from the investment made in
production facilities and the marketing and distribution networks. For a ‘Big Five’ British
bank, the first two of these inter-related criteria were both achieved by investment in
an extensive branch network controlled by a central head office; this strategy was also
permissive of the adoption of new technology which not only cut costs but also increased
the potential for managerial co-ordination and supervision. Here, investment in human
capital, Chandler’s third criterion, was essential. In English commercial banks managers
were recruited and trained to ensure that they were able to administer the enlarged
facilities and increased personnel required for production and distribution on a much
enlarged scale; in addition, at the strategic level of senior management, systems were
developed to monitor and co-ordinate those two basic functional activities and to plan
and allocate resources for future production and distribution.
Perhaps Chandler’s analytical framework can be made general; maybe its range stretches
beyond the manufacturing sector. Here it is used to investigate the nature of investment
to secure capabilities by the commercial banks, which are representative of the services
sectors and, specifically, the financial services. Given the nature of Britain’s economic
development, it is not surprising that this development was well-established in the services
sectors from a very early point in the history of this global phenomenon. However, this
suggestion does not seem so far removed from Chandler’s original conception which
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stressed the initial development and impact of managerial achievements in the service
sectors: first, by the railroad, urban transit and telegraph companies and, second, by the
urban departmental stores which took advantage of the distributive opportunities provided
by the former.76 Yet another theme of Chandler’s discussion of the emergence of the
modern industrial corporation is the powerful competitive advantage achieved by a small
number of first movers who quickly come to dominate their industry as oligopolists:77
given their size, longevity and the structure of their industry, the ‘Big Five’ British banks
provide not only an excellent example of ‘first mover advantage’ but also a manifestation
of the limitations of this concept.78
The developments in managerial structures and practices related here also have im-
plications for any appraisal of the role of the ‘Big Five’ in the British economy. It would
appear that much of the criticism voiced about the performance of the commercial banks
in the interwar period has been misdirected.79 In the 1920s, they were, of course, engaged
collectively in industrial finance to an extent which was unprecedented. Moreover, it
was because of this involvement that the commercial banks became so enmeshed in the
rationalisation schemes which recently have been documented by various economic
historians.80 However, it is also clear that the commercial banks were themselves very
much alive to the potential benefits of new management structures and new technology;
specifically, they assessed and implemented the then progressive information technology
offered by machine accounting.
In making their assessments of this machinery, the banks benefited from information
relating not only to existing users of these capital goods, ranging from insurance firms to
railway companies, both at home and abroad, but also from the manufacturers of office
machinery themselves, who sought custom by providing advice about management infor-
mation systems.81 By 1930 senior managers of the ‘Big Five’ were well aware of the
potentialities and pitfalls of technical change and the introduction of new management
systems – from their own experiences. This alone must have confirmed to them that,
although advice came cheap (and criticism even cheaper), what was really important was
to know the organisation of an individual business inside out. Moreover, by the mid-1930s,
with the diffusion of budgetary control and the development of more accurate costing
systems, the major clearing banks could look forward to clients providing better quality
information, confident that senior bank staff would be sufficiently experienced and better
equipped to express an expert opinion on the technical excellence, credit worthiness and
potential profitability of an applicant’s business.82 However, although the ‘Big Five’ had
made the transition to the corporate form by the early 1930s, they could only encourage
by example and exhortation, leading where many other firms would eventually follow.
In the four decades before 1939 managerial structures of the ‘Big Five’ in Britain were
transformed, albeit with different emphasises in each case and with responses which
were determined by individual factors that had shaped the historical development of
each bank’s corporate culture. When we turn to the development of internal management
structures, so essential for the elements which comprise the Corporate Economy, we find
that British commercial banks had developed the structures which define competitive
managerial capitalism. Furthermore, the managerial systems introduced before 1925 were
the subject of subsequent systematic review. The introduction of new technology, in the
form of machine accounting, was taken as an opportunity to assess not only the efficiency
of the existing managerial systems but also to envisage alternatives – the banks engaged
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in a comprehensive review of their practices and systematically appraised options for the
future.83 Recognition of this managerial dynamic calls into question not only the as-
sumption, voiced not infrequently by economic historians of the interwar period, that
the banks were conservative and ineffective, but also assertions of their naive disinterest
in corporate development in the industrial sector.
The last word, like the first, perhaps should go to Keynes who demonstrated in 1927
a particularly percipient view of the future of banking organisation and mechanisation.
In response to a question about the Labour Party’s policy on nationalisation he reiterated
his view that the ‘Big Five’ were already semi-socialised, or nationalised; in addition to
their activities being of national scope, there was already a divorce between ownership
and management and the banks were largely controlled by those in the receipt of salaries.
Furthermore, indicating his appreciation of the extent, role and potential of the corporate
organisation in the corporate economy, and anticipating correctly the reformist nature
of twentieth century Labour governments, Keynes continued:
’“The banks are evolving most of the things the Labour party wants everything to be
like”. What the Labour party wants is to make all other businesses like banks.’ 84
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